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Abstract—This paper proposes an iterative bidding framework for integrated due date 
management decision making. We focus on a type of make-to-order environment, in which a firm 
needs to quote due dates and prices and to schedule the production of a variety of job orders 
required by a large group of customers. In most cases, customers prefer shorter due dates. 
However, given limited production capacity and various cost constraints, the firm has to balance 
the attractiveness of their due date quotations and the reliability in terms of scheduling and 
delivering accepted job orders. The key issue here is how to integrate due date management 
decisions such that high quality solutions which benefit both the firm and the customers can be 
obtained.  We study the integrated due date management in an economic setting where customers 
are modeled as self-interested agents and the objective of the firm is to maximize social welfare. 
We present an iterative bidding framework as a decentralized decision support tool which enables 
the integration of key due date management decisions. Effective solutions are achieved through 
the automated negotiation between the firm and its customers. We provide analytical results on the 
application of the proposed framework to two special cases of the integrated due date 
management. We also evaluate the performance of the framework on general due date 
management problems through a computational study.  
 
Keywords: Due date management; Scheduling; Make to order; Auctions; Iterative bidding; 
Bidding languages; Multilateral negotiation  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In supply chain management, the due date of an order is the promised date that the supplier will 
deliver the product(s). The task of due date management (DDM) is to determine, in a timely 
manner, if and when an order can be fulfilled profitably. As in other management processes, DDM 
involves different types of decisions, namely pricing, order acceptance (or demand management), 
due date setting, and scheduling[1]. These decisions are interrelated. In general, demand can be 
modeled as a function of market price and delivery time. Customer demand usually increases with 
lower delivery times as well as with lower prices [2, 3]. In the case of make-to-order 
manufacturing, before a firm agrees to accept an order, it evaluates the ‘profitability” of that order 
given the resources (e.g. manufacturing capacity) required to satisfy that order and other potential 
orders that could demand those resources. In addition, the customer and the firm need to agree on 
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the terms of the transactions, in particular, on the price and the due date. If the price or the due date 
quoted by the firm is too high compared to what the customer is willing to accept, the customer 
may choose not to place the order. Alternatively, if the price the customer is willing to pay is low 
or the due date requested is too short to make it a profitable transaction for the firm, the firm might 
decide not to accept the order. As the DDM decisions are tightly coupled, it is desirable to model 
the interrelations among them and consider them simultaneously. However, given the 
complexities of these decisions, in practice, they are often made sequentially.  The way that a firm 
makes DDM decisions is reflected by the time-based competition strategy it adopts.  
 There are three time-based competition strategies used by firms [3], (1) quick service with 
minimal wait; (2) “uniform” short lead time1 guarantee; (3) due date quotation. The first strategy 
does not involve order acceptance and due date quotation decisions. The focus here is how to 
schedule job orders such that they can be served as fast as possible. The second strategy promises 
a uniform lead time guarantee to all customers. Although, a firm can influence the demand rate by 
adjusting the length of the guaranteed lead time, there is no direct integration between the 
decisions of order acceptance and scheduling. In fact, under this strategy, there is a risk that 
demand may exceed the firms’ capacity to respond. Uniform lead time guarantee is widely adopted 
in the service and make-to-order manufacturing sectors [3, 4]. While the strategy may be easy to 
implement and effective in terms of attracting more customers, it has certain negative impacts, 
especially in make-to-order manufacturing. As pointed in[1], since the lead times are set without 
considering the characteristics of the order and the current status of the production, they may be 
unrealistic in terms of production scheduling, thereby worsening lead time performance, leading to 
disappointed customers, and/or  inflicting higher costs due to expediting. On the other hand, the 
lead times will be overstated when the demand is low and some customers may choose to go 
elsewhere. Furthermore, adding additional capacity may be inevitable to maintain the reliability of 
on-time delivery. The added capacity increases the total production costs and affects the price of 
the products provided. Although industry practice suggests that customers may be willing to pay a 
price premium for shorter delivery times [5], in the cases where the premium that a customer is 
willing to pay cannot compensate the cost of expediting, accepting short-lead-time orders becomes 
un-profitable.  
The third strategy encourages potential customers to get a due date “quote” prior to ordering. As 
 
1 In the context of DDM, the lead time is defined as the number of working days between the release date of the order and its due date.  
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the quoted due dates can be calculated based on the schedule of already accepted orders, this 
strategy has the potential of integrating due date quotation and scheduling decisions. In addition, 
by quoting prices and due dates, the firm makes an order selection/acceptance decision by 
influencing which orders finally end up the system. This strategy is more aggressive than the first 
one because a “quoted” lead time is considered as an irrevocable offer and, once accepted by the 
customer, the firm needs to deliver as promised. Otherwise, delay penalties may occur. Given 
limited capacities of a firm, the due date quotation strategy has the potential of effectively 
coordinating the DDM decisions and achieving optimal solutions in terms of resource utilization 
and profit. However, this strategy is difficult to implement. In addition to that more decisions need 
to be considered concurrently, if counter offers from customers are allowed, the implementation of 
this strategy also requires a multilateral negotiation mechanism between the firm and its 
customers.  
The purpose of this research is to develop an iterative bidding based multilateral negotiation 
framework to support the integration of DDM decisions under the due date quotation strategy. 
Unlike some on-line dynamic bidding systems [6, 7], we focus on an off-line setting, in which all 
the information about the problem, such as the job arrival and processing times, are available at the 
beginning of the scheduling horizon. In this setting, the resource requirements of multiple job 
orders need to be considered concurrently during the decision making process. Our main 
contribution is the design of the multi-lateral negotiation framework for DDM. The framework is 
implemented by an iterative bidding procedure. It incorporates all key DDM decisions. It also 
provides DDM process automation, which allows the firm and its customers to construct efficient 
production schedules through automated multilateral negotiation. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 describes and formulates the integrated DDM problem. Section 3 
presents the structure and components of the proposed iterative bidding framework. Section 4 
provides theoretical analysis on the properties of the framework and evaluates its performance 
through a computational study. Section 5 compares the proposed framework with existing DDM 
approaches. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future improvements of the framework. 
II. THE INTEGRATED DUE DATE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM 
Integrated DDM is a decentralized multilateral decision making process. From the perspective of 
the firm, it combines pricing, order selection, due date setting, and scheduling decisions. The 
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decisions facing the customer are whether she should place the order given the price and due date 
offered by the firm and how to assign prices to the due dates in a counter offer to maximize her 
benefit. We assume that the firm has limited manufacturing capacity that can be used to process 
job orders from customers and the objective of the firm is to maximize the market efficiency, 
which is the sum of the values on a solution across all customers, rather than its revenue
2
. Each 
customer has one job order to be processed by the firm. An order has a release time, a preferred due 
date, and a deadline. The customer’s value on an order (the price that she is willing to pay) declines 
with the delay of the delivery date. The customers’ value functions are their private information. 
The Integrated DDM problem involves the selection of customer orders and allocation of the 
manufacturing resources of the firm to the orders such that the deadline requirements of all 
selected orders are met and the sum of customers’ values is maximized.  
 
 
Figure 1 The DDM problem setting in a windows and doors company 
 
As an example, we present a typical integrated DDM problem based on a case study from[9] as 
follows
3
. As shown in Figure 1, a firm manufactures windows and doors for home builders as well 
as individual home owners. The products are customized based on the requirements from the 
customers, which may include different types, sizes and quantities, preferred due dates, and 
deadlines. In this setting, the integrated DDM problem facing the firm is to coordinate the 
decisions regarding which order to accept, at what price, and with what delivery date. For 
 
2 We approach the integrated DDM from a social-welfare perspective. The objective of DDM in this context is to achieve efficient solutions in 
decentralized environments, which maximize the social welfare of all participants in the supply chain. In[8] D. C. Parkes and J. Kalagnanam, 
"Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions," Management Science, vol. 51, pp. 435-451, 2005.Parkes and Kalagnanam suggest that 
market efficiency is well suited for the design of stable long-term markets that will form the basis for repeated trade. As in most make-to-order 
cases, customers and the firm will expect repeated trade, it is appropriate to focus on market efficiency in our DDM formulation.  
3 In [9] W. Li, X. Luo, Y. Tu, and D. Xue, " Adaptive production scheduling for one-of-a-kind production with mass customization," 
Transactions of the North American Manufacturing Research Institution of SME, vol. 35, pp. 41-48, 2007., a case study, based on data collected 
from Gienow Windows and Doors Co. Ltd. (Calgary, Alberta, Canada), is presented to verify the effectiveness of an adaptive scheduling algorithm 
at shop floor level. While our scope is at supply chain level, we use this manufacturing setting to demonstrate the integrated DDM problem in 
make-to-order environments.  
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customers they need to decide how to adjust their orders in terms of requested due dates and prices 
offered if their original orders are turned down. Again we consider the off-line DDM problems, in 
which the firm needs to coordinate its DDM decisions across a larger group of customers for a 
specific production time window (say a week or a month) and the information about customers’ 
job orders are available at the beginning of the decision making process.    
A. Centralized Formulation 
As previously mentioned we consider integrated DDM as a decentralized decision making 
problem in the sense that the actual valuation of a customer on due dates is private information to 
the customer, which is not known to the firm. However, to clearly demonstrate the combinatorial 
optimization nature of the problem, we first assume a centralized environment, i.e., customers’ 
valuations are known to the firm.  With this assumption, we can conveniently model the problem 
as a mixed integer program. The decentralized characteristic of the problem will be considered 
when we develop the game theoretic modeling and iterative bidding framework.  
Consider a type of the DDM problem which consists of a set of   customers, denoted  , and a 
firm. Each customer           has a job to be processed by the firm. A job requires the 
processing of a sequence of operations                . An operation                
        has a specified processing time       
  and its execution requires the exclusive use of a 
designated resource for the duration of its processing. There are precedence constraints among 
operations of a job, that is,      must precede      .             , if     and        need to be 
processed on the same resource, otherwise              . A job   has a release 
time                           .    is the earliest time that job   can be available for processing. 
    is the latest completion time of job   in a schedule. For a schedule   which contains an 
allocation of the firm’s production resources to customer orders, a customer will have a valuation 
on  . In this paper we follow the definition of valuation as described in the private value model, 
introduced by Vickrey [10]. In integrated DDM, each customer has a value for each schedule and 
these values do not depend on the private information of the other customers. Each customer 
knows her values, but not the values of the others. A customer will not accept any schedule   if its 
job to be completed after the job’s hard deadline    or before its release time   . In these cases, the 
customer’s valuation on   is zero or, in terms of DDM, the customer’s job is not accepted. In our 
model, we also allow customers to request preferred due dates. For customer  , her preferred due 
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date is denoted as   .   (  ) is the valuation customer   assigns to a schedule in which her job is 
completed before    . Completion of a job after its preferred due date is allowed. However, for 
delayed jobs, there are extra costs incurred to the customer. For a schedule  , if  customer   has her 
job completed at   , her valuation on   is defined as         (  )   (  ), where    is the 
completion time of job   in  ;   (  ) is a non-decreasing function gives the cost incurred for a 
delayed     within the acceptable delay window         . For the time window            
in which the job is not delayed,   (  )   . The DDM involves the selection of a set of job orders 
     such that the scheduling constraints for all selected jobs are satisfied and, at the same time, 
the sum of customer values is maximized. Let      be the starting time of the operation    of the job 
 ; let       if job   is selected and      otherwise; also let              if       is performed 
before         and              otherwise (   
     The optimization problem, denoted CDM, is to 
solve  
   ∑   (  (  )    (  ))
 
    ,                          (1)    
subject to 
             ,                                 (2) 
                                                (3) 
(         )                                       (4) 
                                                     (5) 
                                                     ,           (6) 
                                                ,              (7) 
                                                               (8) 
           {   } ,                                 (9) 
   {   }                                     (10) 
                                             (11) 
where           ,      ,           (         in (5)) and  
         .  The set of 
constraints (3) and (4) ensures that the operations of a job do not start before its release time and 
finish after its deadline. The set of constraints (5) ensure that an operation does not start before the 
previous operation of the same job is completed. The set of constraints (6) is a set of logical 
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constraints which states the following: if two jobs   and    are selected in the schedule, and 
operations      and        are to be processed on the same resource (            ), and      
precedes        (            ), then                 . These constraints ensure that, at most, one 
operation can be processed by a particular resource at a time, where   is a large positive constant, 
which is used for the linearization of the logical constraint “if”. Explanations on how this “large 
positive constant technique” is used in scheduling problem formulation can be found in [11]. The 
minimum value of   depends on the problem instance. In general, a      (    )     (    ), 
where          and          , is large enough to enforce the logical “if” constraint. 
Constraints (7) and (8) ensure the values assigned to the two related variables             and 
          
 
are consistent, that is, if      and         are to be processed on the same resource, 
then                         . Constraints (9), (10), (11) are non-negative and integer constraints. 
Having modeled the integrated DDM in a job shop environment, we gain insights to the 
complexity of the problem in terms of number of constraints and variables. We also know that 
CDM is a nonlinear model as the objective function of CDM is nonlinear. Now we turn our 
attention to the game theoretical modeling of the problem by considering customer valuations as 
private information not known to the firm. As the computational complexities inherited from the 
combinatorial nature of the scheduling problem are not related to the game theoretical modeling, 
we ignore the scheduling details and focus only on strategic interactions. We first model the 
integrated DDM as a game. We then construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction that 
solves the game with an economically efficient outcome.  
B. Game Theoretic Modeling and an Auction Construction 
In the centralized formulation, we have assumed that customers’ valuations are known to the 
firm. In the game theoretic modeling, we remove this assumption and consider customers’ 
valuations are private information and they will behave strategically to maximize their own 
benefits. To reflect this self-interested property of the customers, we call them agents
4
. Let  
denotes a set of   job agents. Each represents a job order from a customer. Job orders need to be 
scheduled in the firm. Let   be the set of all feasible schedules5. An agent    needs to pay the firm 
 
4 In this paper, agents also refer to the trading software entities that represent the customer. From this point forward, when we mention customers 
in the context of system modeling and design, we will use the term “agent”.  
5   can be obtained by solving constraints of CDM as a constraint satisfaction problem. Note that, unlike in classical scheduling theory, a feasible 
schedule for a DDM problem does not have to include all job orders. If a job order is not included in a schedule, the customer’s valuation on the 
schedule is zero.  
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      in exchange for producing its job order as scheduled in  .  The agents must collectively 
choose a schedule    , and a vector of payments                             .  
Our goal is to design a mechanism which enables the collective selection of schedules. As we 
have assumed that the firm maximizes market efficiency, the chosen schedules need to maximizes 
the sum of agent valuations. We use Vickrey’s private value model. Therefore, an agent’s payoff is 
linear in the agent’s valuation of the schedule and the price paid for the schedule, that is 
           . Agents maximize their payoffs. So an agent is willing to pay up to its valuation 
      to obtain the schedule  . In the following, we construct a VCG auction for the DDM 
problem. Let             ∑           and              ∑           . The auction 
proceeds as follows. Each agent submits its valuations on each element of the set of all feasible 
schedules   . The auctioneer chooses    from   as the final schedule, such that     maximizes 
∑         , that is,   
  solves     . In addition, the auctioneer also computes a schedule for 
each    , such that the schedule solves           . After the schedules are computed, agent   
pays 
    
             ∑     
                                       (12)                    
and agent  ’s payoff from participating is 
    
    [         –∑     
     ]      
   ∑     
                       (13) 
                    
It is clearly that                   is non-negative, which means agents always get 
non-negative payoffs when participating in the auction. In addition to providing agents with the 
incentive to participate, the auction is also strategic proof meaning that submitting truth valuations 
to the auctioneer is a dominant strategy. Suppose agent   reports       instead. The auctioneer 
then chooses a   ̃     that solves      [∑               ]. Agent  ’s payoff becomes 
∑   ( ̃)      ( ̃)                                                 (14) 
It is clear that no agent can benefit from misreporting its valuation function.  
Given that the CDM can be used to obtain   and we have constructed the VCG auction that finds 
the optimal schedule in   , it seems that we have everything needed to solve the DDM game. 
However, the reality is, despite VCG’s theoretical elegance, its limitations in terms of 
implementation restrict its application to DDM problems. From the auctioneer’s side, the 
implementation of the VCG auction requires the solution of a      and a           for all     , 
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that is n+ 1 NP-hard optimization problems. The computation cost can be prohibitively expensive 
if the auction is applied to non-trivial size problems. In our case, the underlying scheduling model 
CDM is nonlinear, which usually demands more computation than a linear one. From the agents’ 
side, the VCG auction requires an exponential number of schedules in   to be valued by each agent, 
which presents hard valuation problems to agents. In addition to computation, communicating the 
large number of schedules to agents can also be a huge burden to the system. Most importantly, 
VCG requires complete valuation on alternative schedules to be revealed to the auctioneer. In 
DDM, customers are often reluctant to do so when that information might leak out and adversely 
affect other decisions or negotiations. Transparency is another practical concern in VCG auctions. 
It can be difficult to explain to the customers why a certain schedule is chosen.  In the following 
section, we propose an iterative bidding framework aimed at addressing some of the limitations 
arising in the application of VCG to DDM.   
III. THE ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK 
The iterative bidding framework proposed in this paper is an auction-based approach to the 
integrated DDM problem. The framework contains three major components, a requirement-based 
bidding language, a linear integer programming model for winner determination, and an iterative 
bidding procedure. The requirement-based bidding language allows an agent’s bid to be expressed 
by a requirement of processing a job, which naturally represents scheduling constraints and 
objectives. The winner determination model takes bids expressed in the requirement-based 
language as input and computes feasible schedules which maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. The 
iterative bidding procedure provides a structure for agents and the auctioneer to interact in a 
systematic way and eventually evolve the provisional solutions towards an optimal or near optimal 
one. Iterative bidding also reduces agents’ information revelation and adds the potential of 
accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process.  The iterative bidding framework is 
a multi-attribute auction, which allows negotiation over price and a non-price attribute: the due 
date of an agent’s schedule. In addition, the framework has good privacy preserving properties. 
For example, unlike VCG auctions, it does not require agents’ knowledge about the resources, 
such as their capabilities, availabilities and configurations. Also, it does not require complete 
revelation of agents’ valuations.  
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A. Requirement-Based Bidding Languages 
In integrated DDM, customers derive values based on how their jobs are scheduled according to 
their objectives. From a scheduling perspective, the quality of a schedule can be measured by time 
related parameters, e.g. completion times, tardiness. During the due date negotiation with a firm, a 
customer can often express her preferences using a conditional statement. For example, a customer 
may say she is willing to pay a specific price if her job is completed within a time window, e.g. 
        . There are three components in this conditional statement, the job, the time window 
and the price. In this section, we propose a requirement-based language for the representation of 
customers’ preferences in terms of these three elements. We first define the atomic bid (C-Bid) of 
this language. 
C-Bid is a 4-tuple 〈           〉 where R is the requirement of processing a job consisting of a 
set of operations to be performed, the precedence constraints among them and resource 
requirements.   is the price that the agent is willing to pay for   to be completed within the time 
window             where   denotes the completion time of R ,     stands for earliest 
finishing time, and     stands for latest finishing time, which is the required due date by the 
customer. C-Bids can be connected by XOR connective as a XOR-C-Bid to represent values that a 
customer has on different time windows. For example, 
〈                   〉   〈                   〉 indicates that the customer   is willing to pay   if 
  is completed with                  and    if    is completed with                  . 
Implicitly here, the customer only wants    to be processed once and there is no overlap between 
the two time windows. If we restrict the value of   to integers, the requirement based language has 
full expressiveness in terms of representing customers’ valuations using an XOR-C-Bid with finite 
number of C-Bids.  
Proposition 1 If the value of     is restricted to integers for a customer    , any valuation of 
customer    in integrated DDM can be represented by an XOR-C-Bid with finite C-Bids. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
In Proposition 1, we have proved that if    is restricted to integers, a customer   can express her 
full preferences by assigning a value to each possible    with         . This restriction is 
reasonable as customers usually define their due dates in terms of the number of certain time units 
such as hours or days from the time when a job is released. In addition, by restricting the values of 
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the completion times of all jobs to integers, we will have a finite set of     , which provides us 
with the possibility of formulating a linear winner determination model as shown in the next 
section. 
B. Linear Winner Determination Model 
Given the set of XOR-C-Bids from customers, the task of winner determination is to select a 
subset of the bids such that all scheduling constraints are satisfied and, at the same time, the sum of 
customer’s value is maximized. A C-Bid can represent a customer’s value over a time window 
defined by the     and    . This is natural because, very often, a customer could be indifferent 
between the completion times within a certain time interval (a block of adjacent time units). 
Suppose a customer has    indifferent time intervals within the acceptable delayed window 
        . Accordingly an XOR-C-Bid with   C-Bids can be constructed to represent the 
customer’s valuations within the window.  With the non-delayed          interval included, 
the full valuation of a customer can be represented by  
〈                   〉   〈                   〉   〈                   〉     
   〈                    〉 (or in short,          〈                   〉 ), where           , 
         ,      (  ). We assume that the    time intervals are adjacent, that is          
       for       . Given that        can be obtained from   , it is sufficient to represent the 
customer’s valuations through a simplified version of the XOR-C-Bid,           〈            〉 . 
The simplified version does not use    , however, it contains all the information needed to 
uniquely construct a corresponding full version of the XOR-C-Bid.     
In fact, in most due date quotation scenarios, customers usually use the format of the simplified 
XOR-C-Bid to express their preferences. For example, they might say “if you promise to complete 
the job by Thursday, I will pay you $1000; however, if the completion time is Friday, I can only 
pay you $900”. In many cases, an XOR-C-Bid without     can be a natural format for expressing 
customers’ preferences. In the following, we formulate a winner determination model, denoted 
LDM, which takes the simplified version of XOR-C-Bids from customers as input. By doing this, 
we make the format of the inputs more intuitive for customers. Note that, as stated in Proposition 1, 
an XOR-C-Bid has the capability to represent a customer’s full valuation. However, this does not 
mean a customer will reveal her valuation in the XOR-C-Bid submitted to the firm. Iterative 
13 
 
bidding is essentially a price system, not a direct revelation mechanism. The bidding prices do not 
necessarily correspond to a customer’s valuations. In LDM, we denote the bidding price from 
customer   on        as   (      ). We also need to define several variables.  Let        if job   is 
completed before        and         otherwise; let      be the starting time of the operation    of 
the job  ; also let              if       is performed before         and              otherwise 
(         Let             , if     and        need to be processed on the same resource, 
otherwise             . The winner determination model LDM can be formulated as follows.   
   ∑ ∑       (      )
  
   
 
   ,                            (15) 
 ∑     
  
     ,                                   (16) 
        ∑     
  
                                      (17) 
 (         )             ,                             (18) 
                                                     (19) 
                                                           ,          (20) 
                                                     ,            (21) 
                                                                  (22) 
           {   } ,                                 (23) 
     {   }                                     (24) 
                                             (25) 
where           ,      ,           (         in (14)),           and  
         .   
Unlike that of CDM, the objective function of LDM is linear. Constraints (16) ensure that only one 
C-Bid of an XOR-C-Bid is selected in the schedule. Constraints (17) to (25) are essentially 
constraints (3) to (11) from CDM, except that here variable   has a two dimension index. For the 
sake of completeness and readability, we reproduce the constraints here. 
LDM takes simplified XOR-C-Bids as input. Constraints (18) show that LDM only requires a 
job to be finished before the    . Job completion after the     is not required. Adding constraints 
(17), the actual semantic meaning of a simplified C-Bid 〈            〉 in LDM is interpreted as 
〈               〉 (LDM interpretation). However, the original meaning of 〈            〉 as it is 
constructed should be interpreted as 〈                   〉(EFT interpretation, as it considers     ). 
14 
 
Would this “misinterpretation” make any difference in winner determination? The answer depends 
on whether the agents submit their full valuation in XOR-C-Bids. In the case that agents submit 
their full valuation (this happens in a direct revelation mechanism), as stated in Proposition 2, 
interpreting 〈            〉 as 〈               〉 does not lead to different optimal solutions. Before 
presenting Proposition 2, it is useful to go through a small example which demonstrates the basic 
idea of the proposition.  
Example1: Suppose that agent  ’s full valuation can be described by a simplified XOR-C-Bid, 
〈             〉   〈             〉  and from    we know         . In LDM the 
XOR-C-Bid is interpreted as 〈                   〉   〈                   〉 . Since 
〈                   〉is equal to 〈                   〉   〈                   〉 , agent 
 ’s full valuation can be written as 〈                   〉   〈                   〉   
   〈                   〉. Note that, in these three C-Bids, the first one and second one have 
identical   ,     and    . That is they can be processed by the same production resources. 
Whenever a schedule can accommodate the second C-Bid, it must be able to accommodate the first 
one. Because the two C-Bids are connected by XOR, only one of them can be included in a 
schedule. Given that the two C-Bids require the same production resources and the price of the 
first C-Bid is $200 is greater than that of the second one,  the second C-Bid will never be selected 
in a final schedule because LDM maximizes the sum of prices. Therefore removing the second 
C-Bid from the valuation does not change the optimal solutions. Customer ’s valuation now can be 
represented by 〈                   〉   〈                   〉 , which is the EFT 
interpretation of the simplified XOR-C-Bid.  
Proposition 2 If customers submit their full valuations in the format of simplified XOR-C-Bids, 
for the winner determination model LDM, LDM interpretation and EFT interpretation of the bids 
do not lead to different optimal solutions.  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
As described in the next section, LDM is used for winner determination for the iterative bidding 
procedure. In each round of the bidding, agents do not submit a complete valuation. In fact, partial 
revelation of customers’ valuations is one of the main benefits of iterative bidding. Without 
complete revelation, neither full version nor simplified version of C-Bids can guarantee optimal 
solutions. However, the simplified C-Bids provide potential gains in terms of accommodating 
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more customers in the provisional schedule. This is because constraints (18) in LDM do not 
require jobs to be completed after    . The simplified C-Bids in LDM can result in a larger solution 
space.  
Terminate
Price Update and Bidding:
Agents update bidding prices 
and  calculate utility 
maximization bids and send 
them to the auctioneer
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Auctioneer checks termination 
condition based on the bids 
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Figure 2 Overview of the iterative bidding and pricing process  
 
C. The Iterative Bidding  
The iterative bidding procedure is depicted as a flow chart in Figure 2.  Initially, an agent has a job 
to be processed. Before submitting the first bid, the agent needs to initialize a reserve price for the 
job to be completed between its preferred due date and any other delayed due dates, i.e.     . The 
reserve price reflects the basic cost of processing a job. Usually a firm will not go below it for a 
loss.  If an agent has no estimation about the reserve price, it can set the initial reserve prices as 
zero. However, appropriate setting-up of initial bidding prices can speed up the overall bidding 
process and, at the same time, maintain the solution quality. In our iterative bidding framework, 
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agents have the incentive to obtain the right reserve prices. It is irrational to submit bids below the 
reserve prices because those bids will be rejected by the auctioneer. An alternative way is to 
acquire reserve prices from the auctioneer before the bidding starts.  After setting up the reserve 
prices, agents use them as the first round bidding prices.  
1) Price Update and Bidding  
At the beginning of round        , agents need to update their bidding prices for each of their 
due dates. This is based on the provisional schedule which resulted from the winner determination 
at round    . If an agent was not included in the provisional schedule at round    , it has three 
price updating options at round  : 
(1) It can increase its bidding prices by    on due dates it bid for at round     or rounds before 
   , where   is the minimum increment imposed by the auctioneer. Since agents are assumed to 
be rational in maximizing their utilities, they, in general, do not bid with an increment more than   
. However, an agent is allowed to bid aggressively with higher bidding prices than the minimum 
increment. This may happen when an agent believes that the competition is heavy and bidding 
with minimum increment is just a waste of time and communication cost and the minimum 
increment will not get her into a provisional schedule.  
(2) It can also keep the bidding prices unchanged (taking a  discount). However, if an agent takes 
this  discount, the auctioneer will consider the agent has entered into final bid status and the agent 
is forbidden from increasing the bidding prices at any of its due dates in future rounds; 
(3)Alternatively, it can of course withdraw from the bidding process 
If an agent is included in the provisional schedule at round    , it can keep its bidding price 
unchanged at round  . That is, it is allowed to repeat its bid at round    . However, the bidding 
procedure does not prevent them from bidding higher.  
After updating its bidding prices, an agent needs to compute its set of utility maximizing C-Bids 
based on the updated bidding prices and its valuation on indifferent time intervals. In computing 
such a set, an agent   solves a maximization problem      {      }[  (      )    
 (      )] and 
obtains the set of C-Bids which equally maximize its utility, where   
 (      ) is the bidding price 
for        at round  . That is, for any two due dates   and  
 in the utility maximizing set, 
  (      )    
 (      )=  (       )    
 (       ).  After obtaining the set of utility maximizing 
C-Bids, the agent joins them together as an XOR-C-Bid and submits it to the auctioneer. If an 
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agent has entered into final bid status, it is no longer allowed to increase it bidding price. However, 
the auctioneer can choose to allow the agent to repeat its final bid in future rounds until 
termination. The purpose for this final bid repeating arrangement is to boost auctioneer’s revenue. 
During the iterative bidding process, some bids can be temporarily “excluded” from the 
provisional schedule by a particular combination of scheduling constraints and resource 
requirements from other bids with higher combined values.  After several rounds, that particular 
combination may have changed and this change may allow the space for the previously excluded 
bids to be included in the schedule. However, without final bid repeating, those bids will not be 
submitted again if their valuations have been reached during the “excluded” periods. Therefore, 
they cannot be included anymore, even though there are spaces for them in provisional schedules 
later on. 
2) Bids Screening and Termination 
Once receiving XOR-C-Bids from the agents, the auctioneer first screens out invalid bids. Those 
bids will not be considered in the following winner determination procedure. Invalid bids are 
defined as follows: 
 Any bidding price for a due date, which is below the highest bidding price for that due date 
received in previous rounds. 
 Bids with increased prices from agents who already declared their final bidding status in 
previous rounds.   
 Bids with bidding prices which are below the reserve prices. 
The auctioneer then checks the termination condition against the valid bids. The auction 
terminates if there are no price updates for all valid bids in this round. That is, all agents that bid in 
the last round have repeated their bids. After the auction terminates, the auctioneer implements the 
final schedule and the agents pay their bidding prices.  If the termination condition is not satisfied, 
the auctioneer will take the set of valid bids as input and solve the winner determination model. 
3) Winner Determination 
The auctioneer needs to compute a new provisional schedule in each round as long as the auction is 
not terminated. At round t , the new provisional schedule    solves:  
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        ∑   
 (      )                                      (26) 
where    is the set of all feasible schedules given the valid bids submitted at round  . By           
we mean the due date        of agent   is satisfied in the provisional schedule   . As the input for 
winner determination is a collection of XOR-C-Bids consisting of simplified C-Bids, the LDM 
model can be used for winner determination. 
LDM can be solved using standard integer programming optimization packages or dedicated 
winner determination algorithms. In [12], we have developed a constraint-based winner 
determination algorithm which allows only one single C-Bid from an agent. The algorithm was 
designed for the single attribute (price) negotiation and did not take XOR-C-Bids. For the 
Multi-attribute negotiation model LDM, we expand the capability of the algorithm allowing agents 
to negotiate over both prices and due dates. LDM can take an agent’s preference over these two 
attributes in the format of an XOR-C-Bid. However the constraint is at most one C-Bid of an 
XOR-C-Bid can be awarded. To handle this restriction, we have added a checking mechanism to 
the constraint-based winner determination algorithm to prevent the algorithm from selecting more 
than one C-Bids from the same XOR-C-Bid into a provisional schedule. The checking mechanism 
is implemented in the Select-Unassigned-Bid ( AV ) method of Algorithm 1 in [12] . When the 
method selects an unassigned C-Bid, it first checks the current schedule. If there is a C-Bid from 
the same XOR-C-Bid has already included, the unassigned C-Bid will be excluded from the 
selection. For the details of the constraint-based winner determination algorithm, readers are 
referred to [12].  
 
Figure 3 Example of a DDM problem, in which two agents with multiple-due-date-valuations compete for the 
processing of their one-operation jobs. 
 
D. An Example 
This section presents a worked example of the iterative bidding procedure. As shown in Figure 
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3, Agent1’s valuation can be expressed by XOR-C-Bid: 2,$11,10,5,$10,8, 11 RXORR , where 1R
is the job requirement of Agent1;  Agent2’s valuation can be expressed by XOR-C-Bid: 
2,$11,9,6,$9,8, 22 RXORR , where 2R is the job requirement of Agent2. Assume that the resource 
has the reserve price of 1 dollar an hour and the price increment 2$ . The bidding prices and 
allocation of each round of the iterative bidding are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Bidding process of an iterative bidding example 
Round Utility Maximizing Bids Bidding Prices Allocation Auctioneer Sum of 
# Agent-1 Agent-2 Agent-1 Agent-2 
Agent-1 Agent-2 
Revenue    values 
  (8,10] (10,11] (8,9] (9,11] (8,10] (10,11] (8,9] (9,11]     
  $5  $2  $6  $2  $5  $2  $6  $2      
1 *   *   2 1 1 2 (8,10]   2 5 
2 *   *   2 1 3 2   (8,9] 3 6 
3 * * *   4 1 3 2 (10,11] (8,9] 4 8 
4 * * *   4 1 3 2     4 8 
 
The iterative bidding proceeds as follows: 
1) Round #1: the agents use the reserve prices for their jobs as the bidding prices. Agent1 uses a 
simplified XOR-C-Bid and bids on due date 10:00, 〈        〉, which requires the time interval 
(8, 10], and Agent2 bids on due date 9:00, 〈       〉, which requires the time interval (8, 9], 
because, given the current bidding prices, these two due dates maximize agents’ utilities. The 
auctioneer includes only Agent1 into the provisional schedule because the two bids cannot coexist 
in a schedule and Agent1’s bid maximizes auctioneer’s revenue.  
2) Round #2: While Agent1 repeats its bid at Round#1 〈        〉, Agent2 increases its bidding 
price on (8, 9] to $3, 〈       〉. After price update, (8, 10] from Agent 1 and (8, 9] from Agent 2 
become utility maximizing bids. The auctioneer selects only (8, 9] from Agent 2. 
3) Round #3: Agent2 repeats its bid because it was included in the provisional schedule in Round 
#2. Agent1 increases its bidding price on (8, 10] to $4. After bidding price update, both (8, 10] and 
(10, 11] becomes utility maximizing bids from Agent1. So Agent1 sends 1,$11,4,$10, 11 RXORR
to the auctioneer. Given the bids submitted by Agent 1 & 2, it is easy to see that there are two 
solution schedules with the same revenue $4 for the auctioneer, 〈             〉  or 
〈                            〉.  According to the winner determination rule, if there are 
more than one solutions with identical revenue, winner determination prefers the one that includes 
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more agents. Therefore, 〈                             〉 is selected.  
 4) Round #4: Both Agent 1 & 2 repeat their bids. The iterative bidding terminates with an 
optimal schedule.  
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK 
Compared to one-shot auctions, such as VCG, iterative bidding promises reduced computation 
at auctioneer side and partial revelation of the private information at agents’ side. Also, higher 
system transparency makes its adoption easier. However, in general, these benefits are obtained 
with a cost of efficiency. This section evaluates the proposed iterative bidding framework in terms 
of the trade-offs among four properties, namely efficiency, computation, revenue and information 
revelation. The evaluation is conducted in the context of integrated DDM.  We first develop 
efficiency and revenue analysis on the application of the iterative bidding framework to two 
special cases of DDM. We then evaluate the performance of the framework by comparing it with 
VCG auction through a computational study. 
A. Theoretical Results of Two Special Cases 
We have proposed an iterative bidding framework for integrated DDM. It provides a platform 
for customers and the firm to negotiate on both prices and due dates concurrently. However, in 
some cases, negotiation along multiple attributes is not always needed. For example, a customer 
might have a firm single due date (deadline). She would not consider placing an order if the single 
due date is not satisfied. In addition, she is indifferent between the actual completion times as long 
as they are within the single due date. We refer to this type of valuation functions as 
single-due-date-valuation. If all customers’ preferences are single-due-date-valuation, negotiation 
is conducted only along the price dimension because the single due dates are not negotiable. On 
the other hand, prices in certain industries are largely dictated by the market or industrial standards 
(i.e. the case of vehicle maintenance and repair industry). In these industries, the manufacture or 
service provider may not have much flexibility in setting the prices. Therefore, negotiation is 
mainly along the due date dimension. We refer to this type of scenarios as fixed-price scenario. We 
first provide the efficiency result of applying iterative bidding to DDM with 
single-due-date-valuation customers.    
Proposition 3 In integrated DDM problems, if all customers’ preferences are 
single-due-date-valuation and their values on the single due date are congruent to the reserve 
prices modulo   ,the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating always maximizes the 
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sum of customers’ valuations at its termination.  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 3 states, in the case of single-due-date-valuation, if customers’ values are congruent 
to the reserve prices modulo the minimum increment, the iterative bidding procedure can always 
maximize the social welfare of customers without revealing complete valuation information. The 
purpose of the hypothesis, agents’ valuations are congruent to the reserve prices modulo  , is to 
make sure that an agent can bid exactly at its valuation when necessary given the minimum 
increment requirement. If we relax the minimum increment requirement at least once during the 
bidding, such that, when an agent is approaching its valuation, it can always adjust the bidding 
increment as needed and hit the valuation exactly. In this case, the hypothesis is not necessary.  
Let’s now turn our attention to the fixed-price scenario. In fixed-price, the price of processing a 
particular type of jobs is dictated by a commonly known market price or industrial standard. 
Agents have different valuations on different     , however, unlike in the multi-attribute case, 
they cannot signal the auctioneer about their preferences using price mechanism as prices are fixed 
and known up front. The only attribute that they can negotiate with the auctioneer and other agents 
is the    . As previously assumed, an agent will strictly prefer a shorter    . Therefore, there is no 
reason for an agent to submit an XOR-C-Bid consisting of multiple C-Bids with different     . An 
agent will not submit a longer     during the iterative bidding unless they are excluded from the 
provisional schedule. Due to fixed-price restriction, agents cannot indicate their preferences by 
setting bidding prices. Without the guidance of bidding prices, the iterative bidding procedure 
cannot guarantee to converge to the schedule that maximizes agents’ social welfare as it does in the 
single-due-date-valuation case. However, as stated in Proposition 4, the iterative bidding 
procedure with final bid repeating can achieve Pareto optimality, which means, at termination, no 
agent can improve its schedule without hurting at least one agent.    
Proposition 4 For the fixed-price cases of integrated DDM, the iterative bidding procedure with 
final bid repeating terminates with a Pareto optimal schedule.   
Proof: See the Appendix. 
We have established some theoretical results on applying the iterative bidding framework to the 
two special cases of DDM. For general DDM problems, we evaluate the performance of our 
framework through a computational study. We start with defining the evaluation metrics. 
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B. Experimental Evaluation Metrics   
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we evaluate the iterative bidding framework in 
terms of efficiency, computation (running time), revenue and information revelation. These 
metrics were developed in[13] for testing the performance of iBundle, an iterative combinatorial 
auction for general combinatorial auction problems. We redefine them in the context of integrated 
DDM: 
Efficiency of Scheduling,       , is measured as the ratio of the value of the final schedule S to 
the value of the optimal schedule that maximizes total value across the agents: 
        
∑   (      )        
∑   (      )        
 
  ,                      (27) 
where    is the optimal schedule given customers’ valuations.  
Running Time of Auction refers to the computation time needed to terminate the auction on a 
DDM problem instance. 
Revenue of Auction,       , is measured as the ratio of auctioneer’s income to the value of  the 
optimal solution: 
               
∑   (      )        
∑   (      )        
 
 ,                     (28) 
where  
 
(      ) is the maximum bid from customer  for the due date        during the auction. 
Information Revelation for customer  ,       , is measured as the sum of the final price bid by 
the customer for all due dates in its valuation function, as a fraction of the sum of the true values of 
each due date.  
               
∑   (      )
  
   
∑   (      )
  
   
 ,                       (29) 
The overall auction information revelation,  , is computed as the average information revelation 
over all agents. The auction often terminates before agents have revealed complete information 
about their values for due dates. The information revelation metric is designed to measure the 
extent to which an agent has revealed its value for each due dates to the auctioneer during the 
auction.  
C. Problem Sets 
We construct our DDM testing problem sets using a two-step procedure. We first generate 
single-due-date-valuation problems. The design of the single-due-date-valuation problems is 
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based on a suite of job shop CSP benchmark problems developed in [14].  Two parameters were 
adjusted to cover different scheduling conditions. The first one is a range parameter, RG, which 
controls the distribution of job due dates and release times. The second is a bottleneck parameter, 
BK, which controls the number of major bottleneck resources. Due dates are randomly drawn from 
a uniform distribution            , where        represents a uniform probability 
distribution between   and  , and  is an estimate of the minimum makespan of the problem, 
which is determined by the average duration of all operations and the average duration of the 
operations requiring bottleneck resources. This estimate was first suggested in [15]. Similarly, 
release times are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of the form:         . The price 
of bid j  is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on              , where    is the 
average duration of all bids, and     is the duration of bid   . By considering different 
combinations of RG, BK, and problem sizes (number of operations and number of bids), problems 
with various configurations can be randomly generated. For testing the iterative bidding 
framework, we have generated 15 groups of single-due-date-valuation problems (detailed 
configurations are summarized in Table 2).   
Table 2 Configuration of the DDM Test Problem Sets 
Group Due Dates Operations Bids BK RG Instances 
1 1 5 5 2 0.4 5 
2 1 5 6 2 0.5 5 
3 1 3 7 1 0.5 5 
4 1 2 8 1 0.5 5 
5 1 2 9 1 0.5 5 
6 1 2 10 1 0.5 5 
7 3 5 6 1 0.4 10 
8 3 5 7 1 0.4 10 
19 3 5 8 1 0.4 10 
10 3 5 6 1 0.5 10 
11 3 5 7 1 0.5 10 
12 3 5 8 1 0.5 10 
13 3 5 6 2 0.5 10 
14 3 5 7 2 0.5 10 
15 3 5 8 2 0.5 10 
 
The next step is to generate multiple-due-date problem sets by adding two more due date 
valuations to problem instances of the single-due-date-valuation problem sets. The first due date 
added represents a delay up to 20%. Accordingly, the agent’s value on the delayed due date 
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decreases 20%. The second due date added represents a delay up to 40% and the agent’s value 
decreases 40%. For example,   if the single-due-date-valuation of an agent’s valuation can be 
represented as a C-Bid 10,$10,R , the multiple-due-date-valuation of the agent can be represented 
as an XOR-C-Bid 6$,14,8$,12,10$,10, RXORRXORR .   As shown in the Table 2 we 
generated 9 multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets (Group7-15) all with 5 operations.  
D. Comparison Results 
We compare the iterative bidding framework with VCG in which agents report their complete 
valuations over different due dates at the beginning of the auction and the auctioneer computes the 
optimal schedule to maximize the summation of agent values. We have coded LDM into ILOG 
Optimization Programming Languages (http://www-01.ibm.com/software/websphere 
/products/optimization/) and solved the single-due-date-valuation problems (Group 1-6) using 
ILOG CPLEX. The reason for using ILOG for computation is to validate the correctness of LDM 
and test the performance of ILOG CPLEX on the model. For the multiple-due-date-valuation 
problem sets, we have applied the modified version of our previously developed constraint-based 
winner determination algorithm [12] because CPLEX is relatively slow on these 
multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets.  
 
Figure 4, 5 &6 go around here 
 
We tested the efficiency and the revenue performance of the iterative bidding framework on 
both single-due-date-valuation problem sets and multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets. For 
single-due-date-valuation problems, we tested two price updating options, final bid repeating and 
non final bid repeating. The optimality result for single-due-date-valuation with final bid 
repeating stated in Proposition 3 is validated by the experiments. As we see from the experiment 
data, when 1  , which makes every valuation congruent to every reserve prices, the iterative 
bidding procedure always finds optimal solutions. Figure 4 shows the efficiency and revenue 
performance of the iterative bidding framework over the 6 groups of single-due-date-valuation 
problem sets. It is demonstrated in all 6 problem sets, in general, bidding with final bid repeating 
has higher efficiency and revenue than bidding without it. However, the cost is increased 
computation time. As shown in Figure 5, for the single-due-date-valuation problems, bidding with 
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final bid repeating significantly increases computation time, especially when the minimum 
increment is small. Figure 5 also shows that computation times for both single and multi-due-date 
valuation problems are reduced by increasing the minimum increment.    
 It is interesting to see that for the problem sets with small numbers of bids, such as group 1, when 
bidding without final bid repeating, increasing minimum increment can sometime increase the 
efficiency. This is due to the “temporary exclusion” we mentioned previously. With small 
increments, there will be larger number of rounds before termination, which increases the 
possibility for a bid to be “excluded”. For a problem with a small number of agents, if one is 
“mistakenly excluded” the efficiency cost could be high in terms of the percentage of values across 
a small number of agents. As shown in Figure 6, a larger number of agents help mitigate the 
problem to some extent as we see efficiency goes higher with larger number of bids under non 
final bid repeating. To completely avoid this “temporary exclusion” problem, we have designed 
the final bid repeating price updating rule. From Figure 4, it is clear that final bid repeating is very 
effective in terms of boosting the efficiency. For all 6 groups, bidding with final bid repeating has 
close to 100% efficiency for different values of increments. The same reasoning applies to revenue 
as well.  
 
Figure 7, 8 & 9 go around here 
 
  For the multi-due-date-valuation problem sets (Group 7-15), Figure 7 plots the efficiency of the 
iterative bidding over the 9 problem sets with bid increment 4 . Compared to VGA (100% 
efficiency), on average, the iterative bidding without final bid repeating can achieve more than 
90% efficiency.  Figure 8 shows the Information Revelation performance of the iterative bidding 
procedure. Compared to VCG which requires 100% Information Revelation, the auction requires 
less than 50% at increment=2 and 4. Bigger increment value requires slightly more Information 
Revelation. This makes sense because bigger increments may pass some low price equilibrium 
points which smaller increments may find. Figure 9 compares the run time between the iterative 
bidding procedure and VCG over 9 multi-due-date-valuation problem sets. On average, the 
iterative auction is more than 10 times faster than VCG with the cost of losing 6%-10% efficiency 
as shown in Figure 7.  
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V. RELATED WORK 
DDM involves four types of decisions, namely pricing, order acceptance, due date setting, and 
scheduling. In this paper, we have proposed a framework which allows the integration of these 
decisions. Compared with existing DDM approaches, the main contribution of this work is the 
multi-lateral negotiation framework implemented by iterative bidding, which allows decentralized 
DDM decision making between the firm and its customers.  In this section, we discuss this 
contribution in the context of the DDM literature. Since the proposed framework is an application 
of iterative auctions to DDM, we will also compare the applicability of several economic-based 
software systems to the DDM problems and position our bidding framework in the literature.  
DDM policies proposed in the literature integrate DDM decisions at different levels. To 
facilitate the comparison of the proposed framework with the literature, we group existing DDM 
policies into four categories, namely DS, DSO, DSOP, and BB.  We first describe these categories. 
We then summarize them and provide exemplary references in Table 3.  
DS policies only consider due-date setting and scheduling decisions. They ignore the impact of 
quoted due dates on customers’ decisions to place the orders and usually assume that customers are 
indifferent as to when an order is completed (i.e., due date indifferent) as long as it is within the 
specified deadline. DSO policies add order acceptance decisions to the DS by modeling the 
probability of a customer placing an order as a decreasing function of the quoted due date. DSOP 
policies extend the DSO by modeling the probability of a customer placing an order as a function 
of both quoted price and quoted due date. Negotiation between the firm and its customers is an 
important aspect of the due date quotation strategy. BB policies incorporate a bargaining process 
into bilateral due date decision making. In the model, both the customer and the firm have a 
reservation tradeoff curve between price and due date, which is private information. BB provides a 
negotiation mechanism between the firm and its customers. However, it is a bilateral bargaining 
model, which is not directly applicable to the off-line situations, where the firm needs to optimize 
the DDM decisions across a group of customers concurrently. In the case of a large number of 


































Bilateral bargaining  [29], [30] 
 
Compared with existing work in the DDM literature, the proposed framework integrates all DDM 
decisions and it also supports decentralized decision making through a multi-lateral negotiation 
mechanism. Specifically, the framework extends DSOP by providing decentralized decision 
making through a multilateral negotiation mechanism. It is also more applicable than BB in the 
DDM situations, where the firm needs to deal with multiple customers concurrently because it 
supports multi-lateral concurrent negotiation.   
In this paper, we have modeled the customers as agents who compete with each other for the 
firm’s production resources to schedule their own jobs according to their respective objectives, the 
integrated DDM can be seen as a subclass of scheduling problems in decentralized settings. This 
type of scheduling problems is known as decentralized scheduling problems [31]. In decentralized 
scheduling problems, agents exhibit complementary preferences over discrete goods. As a 
subclass, DDM problems also exhibit complementary preferences in agents. For example, a 
customer usually needs a specific combination of time units on different production resources to 
complete his/her job. Part of the combination may have no value to the customer because the job 
cannot be completed without obtaining the combination as a whole. In the rest of this section, we 
first review economic models that are relevant to DDM; we then analyze their applicability to 







Table 4 Summary of the economic models and their applicability to DDM 
Economic 
models 




Solve resource allocation 
or scheduling problems by 
constructing 
computational markets 
based on general 
equilibrium theory.  
DDM problems exhibit 
indivisibility of goods and 
complementary preferences of 
agents, which violate the ideal 
conditions of the general 
equilibrium theory.  
Performance cannot be 
guaranteed. 





These auctions do not 
allow bids on bundles of 
items. Sequential auctions 
sell multiple items in 
sequence. Simultaneous 
auctions sell multiple items 
in separate markets 
simultaneously. 
In DDM, customers have 
complementary preferences 
over the firm's resources. These 
auctions fail when there are no 
prices that support an efficient 
solution and also when agents 
bid cautiously to avoid 





Allow bidders to submit 
valuations on bundles of 
items.  
Computation demanded to solve 
hard valuation problems and 
winner determination problems 
can be prohibitive, especially for 





Allow bidders to submit 
multiple bids during and 
auction and provides 
information feedback to 
support adaptive and 
focused eliciation.   
Compared with CAs, iterative 
bundle auctions have smaller 
sizes of bids and winner 
determination problems, 
resulting in lower computational 
costs. For DDM problems, they 
are more practical in terms of 
computation than CAs.  
[44],[8],[45],[46],[31] 
 
 Many economic models that have been studied in the literature can be applied to decentralized 
scheduling and DDM to some extent.  While giving a comprehensive review of these models is 
beyond the scope of this paper, in Table 4, we summarize four of them which are of importance to 
DDM. In economics, the concept of a set of interrelated goods in balance is called general 
equilibrium. General equilibrium theory provides a distributed method for efficiently allocating 
goods and resources among agents based on market prices. In applying general equilibrium based 
mechanism to DDM problems, the goods in the markets need to be specified by imposing a 
discretization on the continuous timeline to be scheduled on the firm’s production resources. 
These goods are discrete ones, which violate the infinite divisibility goods condition of general 
equilibrium theory. Markets with discrete goods and complementary preferences of agents can 
lack equilibria [33]. The performance of general equilibrium based market mechanisms on DDM 
problems is not guaranteed.  
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Sequential and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum price of the individual items. 
However, they do not allow bidders to bid on bundles of items. Sequential auctions suppose that 
the set of items are auctioned in sequence. Bidders bid for items in a specific, known order, and can 
choose how much (and whether) to bid for an item depending on past successes, failures, prices, 
and so on. Sequential auctions are particularly useful in situations where setting up a combinatorial 
or simultaneous auctions are infeasible. Simultaneous auctions sell multiple items in separate 
markets simultaneously. Bidders have to interact with simultaneous but distinct markets in order to 
obtain a combination of items sufficient to accomplish their task. Real-world markets quite 
typically operate separately and concurrently despite significant interactions in preferences. A 
typical example is the series of FCC spectrum auctions [37] . In [44]simultaneous auctions are 
designed for decentralized train scheduling problems. A review of the uses of economic theory in 
simultaneous auction design can be found in [47]. Sequential and simultaneous auctions tackle the 
complementarities over resources in the same spirit of general equilibrium theory. These auctions 
fail when there are no prices that support an efficient solution (the existence problem) and also 
when agents bid cautiously to avoid purchasing an incomplete bundle (the exposure problem). 
However, given that these auctions are more practical in terms of computation, they are two 
important models worth further studying.  
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow bidders to place bids on bundles of items. It addresses 
complementary preference issue explicitly. However, computation demanded to solve hard 
valuation problems and winner determination problems can be prohibitive. In general, CAs are 
likely to be practical for smaller size problems. The computational complexities of CAs have been 
studied by various researchers [43]. Some sophisticated algorithms have produced promising 
results [42] . In terms of applying CAs to DDM, if general bundle languages, such as LG or LB 
[48], are used, the timeline of the firm’s production resources needs to be discretized into small 
time units. This timeline discretization usually results in large amount of items to be sold in the 
auction, which lead to bigger size problems.  Applying CAs to a big size DDM can inflict heavy 
computation burdens on both customer side and the firm side. Another limitation with VCG is the 
so called “lying auctioneer” problem [49], which partially explains why Vickery auction is not 
widely used in practice, even though it has been proposed since 1960’s.  
Iterative bundle auctions are iterative implementations of CAs. This class of auction has 
practical significance because it addresses the computational and informational complexities of 
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CAs by allowing bidders to reveal their preference information as necessary as the auction 
proceeds, and bidders are not required to submit (and compute) complete and exact information 
about their private valuations. With careful design of the structure and components, iterative 
bundle auctions have the potential of significantly reducing computational costs in CAs. In 
addition, iterative auctions specially designed for scheduling problems have also been proposed in 
the literature. In [46]  iterative auctions are applied to the job shop scheduling problem. The focus 
in [46] is to investigate the links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangean relaxation, and 
to design auctions based on the Lagrangean based decomposition. In [31], the properties of several 
iterative auction protocols are investigated in the context of decentralized scheduling. In [50] [38], 
price prediction and bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions are studied in the setting of 
market-based scheduling. The proposed framework in this paper is an iterative bundle auction 
specially designed for DDM problems. In many cases, iterative auctions present better 
computational and privacy properties than those of CAs. In addition, iterative auctions have the 
potential of accommodating dynamic events, which is a common requirement in real-world DDM 
applications. Compared with existing iterative bundle auctions, the novelty of our design is that it 
uses a requirement-based bidding language to represent DDM domain specific due date, pricing, 
and job requirements. Unlike general iterative auctions which use bundle languages, the 
requirement-based language avoids imposing timeline discretization, which causes large amount 
of items sold in the auction; the adoption of this language also enables the design of more efficient 
winner determination algorithms which take advantage of the domain specific information to 
improve the search efficiency. Our previous study [51] has shown that, in auction-based 
decentralized scheduling, requirement-based language results in more efficient winner 
determination models than bundle languages do.  
In agent-based manufacturing control literature, the contract net [52] and its later variants have 
been used in DDM as a class of distributed decision making protocols. Unlike auctions, which 
usually require a mediator, contract nets are purely distributed models, in which any agent can act 
as a manager and subcontract tasks to other agents. Most of the agent-based control systems were 
designed for the coordination of production processes within the boundary of an enterprise 
focusing only on the planning and scheduling part of the DDM.  The integration with due date 
quotation and order selection decisions is usually not considered. References and reviews of this 




One of the major challenges facing organizations today is the demand for ever-greater levels of 
responsiveness and shorter defined lead times for deliveries of high-quality goods and services. In 
order to gain an edge over competitors, firms need to gear their management toward time-based 
competition, i.e. providing competitive and reliable lead times. However, shorter lead times are 
not always translated into profits.  Given a firm’s existing production and supply chain 
management processes, shorter lead times usually incur higher costs due to expediting. The 
proposed iterative bidding framework aims at striking the balance between shorter lead times, 
reliable delivery and anticipated profits.  
The uniqueness of the proposed approach is that it integrates the exploration of customers’ due 
date flexibility and the support of the firm’s due date management decisions within an iterative 
bidding framework, which has the potential to coordinate the behaviours of self-interested parties 
in decentralized supply chain environments. For combinatorial (or combinational) auction 
problems[41], linear programming formulations have been developed[55], which enable the 
construction of incentive compatible iterative bidding auctions based on the primal-dual design 
paradigm[44, 56]. For our due date management problem model, the decentralized procedure 
proposed in this paper does not approaches the pricing equilibrium corresponding to the social 
opportunity cost. As our iterative bidding procedure does not terminate with VCG payments, it is 
not incentive compatible under the game theoretic assumption of agent behaviour. However, we 
are designing the system for the type of make-to-order environment in which a firm supplies a 
large group of customers, such as the case of the Windows & Doors, Co, Ltd example. In this 
context, it is reasonable to take the market (price-taking) assumption, that is, agents will bid 
myopically given that each individual agent will have very little impact on the market prices. 
Despite this game theoretic vs. market argument, designing an incentive compatible iterative 
bidding auctions for the integrated due date management problems is a very important research 








Appendix Proofs of propositions 
Proposition 1 If the value of     is restricted to integers for a customer    , any valuation of 
customer    in integrated DDM can be represented by an XOR-C-Bid with finite C-Bids. 
Proof.  By the definition of customers’ value function, we know that for any        and    
 ̅ ,   (  )    . For         , since    is restricted to integers, there are finite number of    
between    and    . For each of them, we can construct a unique C-Bid 〈            〉 where  
    (  ) . By joining these C-Bids, we can construct a XOR-C-Bid which expresses the 
valuation of the customer on          and this XOR-C-Bid contains finite number of C-Bids. 
Implicitly here, for any        and     ̅ ,   (  )   .  █  
 
Proposition 2 If customers submit their full valuations in the format of simplified XOR-C-Bids, for 
the winner determination model LDM, LDM interpretation and EFT interpretation of the bids do 
not lead to different optimal solutions.  
Proof.  Suppose that the complete valuation of a customer is represented by a simplified 
XOR-C-Bid,           〈            〉. According to the definition, its LDM interpretation is 
          〈               〉 ,                          (30) 
For a C-Bid 〈               〉 (        within (30), it can be written as an XOR-C-Bid,  
        〈                   〉 ,                         (31) 
where,           . We call the C-Bids in (31) sub-bids of a C-Bid in (30). Each of the sub-bids 
represents an indifferent time interval of the customer. Note that for a C-Bid in (30), say the      
C-Bid 〈               〉 , its last sub-bid is 〈                   〉 , which is actually the EFT 
interpretation of the corresponding simplified C-Bid 〈            〉. We, therefore, call this last 
sub-bid EFT sub-bid. Given that the EFT interpretation is a sub-bid of the corresponding LDM 
interpretation, if we prove only the EFT sub-bids are effective in the LDM model, other sub-bids 
will be dominated (as seen in Example 1), we can conclude that LDM and EFT interpretations lead 
to same optimal solutions. In the following, we prove that only the EFT sub-bids are effective 
using the format of mathematical induction.  
Basis step:  
Let     . The customer’s valuation becomes  〈        〉    〈            〉  . Since, under 
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LDM interpretation, 〈            〉 will be interpreted as 〈               〉, which can be written as 
〈           〉   〈                   〉 , the LDM interpretation of the customer’s valuation 
becomes 〈           〉   〈           〉   〈                   〉 . In our model, we have 
assumed that customers prefer shorter due dates, that is      . As 〈           〉 requires the 
same resources, release time and due date as those required by 〈           〉, however, with a 
lower price, 〈           〉 will be dominated by 〈           〉 in the optimization process. That is, 
given the presence of 〈           〉, 〈           〉 will never be selected in the final schedule. 
Therefore, for 〈               〉, only the EFT sub-bid 〈                   〉 is effective. 
Inductive step:  
Let    .  Assume that, for all C-Bids in         〈               〉, only the EFT sub-bids  are 
effective and other sub-bids will be dominated in the optimization process. We need to prove that 
for       ,  for all C-Bids in           〈               〉 , only the EFT sub-bids  are 
effective.   
The LDM interpretation of a customer’s valuation (with       ) is 
          〈               〉, which can be written as 
            〈               〉   〈               〉   〈                   〉      (32) 
The last C-Bid in (32) (with     indifferent time intervals) can be represented by XOR-C-Bid: 
  〈                 〉    〈                         
〉                (33) 
The first sub-bid 〈                 〉  in (33) will be dominated by 〈               〉 in (32) 
because          . Therefore, for the two sub-bids in (33) only the EFT sub-bid (last one) is 
effective. Since we have assumed for all C-Bids in         〈               〉, only the EFT 
sub-bids  are effective, it follows that for      ,  for all C-Bids in 
          〈               〉, only the EFT sub-bids  are effective.  Therefore, LDM and EFT 
interpretations of          〈            〉 lead to the same optimal solutions in LDM.  █ 
 
Proposition 3 In integrated DDM problems, if all customers’ preferences are 
single-due-date-valuation and their values on the single due date are congruent to the reserve 
prices modulo   ,the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating always maximizes the 
sum of customers’ valuations at its termination.  
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Proof.  Since customers’ preferences are single-due-date-valuation, they only need to send 
simple C-Bids (no XOR-C-Bids) to express their preferences. We assume private value module for 
all customers. Under this model, each customer has a value for her schedule. A customer’s payoff 
for a schedule is the difference between her value on the schedule and the bidding price. To 
maintain positive payoff, the customer is willing to pay up to her value to get her job scheduled.  
Therefore, if a customer is not included in a provisional schedule, she will keep increasing her 
bidding prices in future rounds until she is included or she reach her valuation. Since we have 
assumed final bid repeating, customers repeat their previous bids at termination (round   . 
Therefore, all customers that are not included in the termination schedule (denoted     ) have bid 
with their valuations and the customers that have room to increase their bidding prices at 
termination are all included in   . We prove the proposition by showing that    is identical to the 
optimal schedule    computed by solving the winner determination problem using all customers’ 
valuations as inputs.   
We construct the customers’ bidding prices for an additional round (round    ) as follows. 
Pick a customer      with bidding price at termination (denoted as   
 ) smaller than her 
valuation. Let   
      
    .    is selected to make sure that    
    is the 
single-due-date-valuation of   . Since we have assumed that customers’ single-due-date-valuations 
are congruent to the reserve prices modulo  ,   must be an integer. For any other customer 
     and    ,    
      
 . Let      be the resultant schedule generated by the winner 
determination for round    . We first proof that          by contradiction. Suppose that 
       , we consider the following two cases. 
Case #1:        
Because    is the schedule that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue given the set of bidding 
prices at round   and we have assumed        , it follows that  ∑   
 
     ∑   
 
      . 
By adding    to both sides, we have  ∑   
 
         
     ∑   
    
            . That 
is ∑   
 
         
    ∑   
    
   
        . Because∑   
   
       ∑   
 
           
   , 
it follows that ∑   
 
         
    ∑   
   
       , which means  
    does not contain the 
set of customers whose bidding prices at round     maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. 




Case #2:        
Because    is the schedule that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue given the set of bidding 
prices at round   and we have assumed        , it follows that  ∑   
 
     ∑   
 
      . 
Since ∑   
 
     ∑   
 
         
 , it is clear that ∑   
 
         
     ∑   
 
      . 
Given the way that bidding prices at round     are constructed and       , we have 
∑   
   
         
    ∑   
   
      ,  which means  
    does not contain the set of 
customers whose bidding prices at round     maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. This is 
also a contradiction to our assumption.  
By deriving two contradictions in case #1 & #2, we can conclude that        .  
 We are now ready to prove that    is optimal, that is      . Note that    is a schedule 
computed using all customers’ valuations as input. In      , customer   has bid with its valuation. 
Since   was a arbitrary pick,          can be a general conclusion for all other customers 
included in   . By repeating the above process for other customers, we can reach a final round 
where all customers included in    bid with their valuations.  Note that, by definition, the resultant 
schedule at this final round is   . Since the resultant schedules do not change during the bidding 
process after round T ,  it follows that      .  Therefore,    maximizes the sum of customers’ 
valuations. █ 
 
Proposition 4 For the fixed-price cases of integrated DDM, the iterative bidding procedure with 
final bid repeating terminates with a Pareto optimal schedule.   
Proof.  Under the fixed-price restriction, at termination, if an agent is not included in the final 
schedule, it must have submitted its deadline. This is because an agent will keep extending its     
in its C-Bids if it is not included during the bidding procedure until the deadline is reached. Given 
that agents also repeat their final bids, at termination, the schedule    is computed based on the 
deadlines from all agents that are not included and the      from the agents that are included. To 
improve their individual schedules, for the agents that are excluded, they have to be scheduled into 
  ; on the other hand, for the agents that are already included, they have to move to positions with 
shorter     . Since    is the optimal solution at termination given the inputs from all agents, in 
both cases, in order to improve an agent’s schedule, at least one other agent will be excluded or 
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Figure 5 Running time of the iterative bidding on a single due date valuation problem set and a multiple due 
date problem set 
 
 
Figure 6 Larger number of bids help mitigate the “temporary exclusion” problem  
 
Figure 7 Efficiency comparison of VCG and the iterative bidding procedure on 9 multi-due-date-valuation 
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Figure 8 Information revelation performance of the iterative bidding procedure over 9 problem sets with bid 
increment 4  and 2  
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